Was Dwight D. Eisenhower an effective military leader?

**Viewpoint:** Yes, Eisenhower was an effective military leader who brilliantly led the Allied Expeditionary Force to crush the Wehrmacht in western Europe.

**Viewpoint:** No, at best Eisenhower was an effective coordinator of Allied resources; he remained too removed from actual battle to be called a leader.

Dwight D. Eisenhower was a master of the political aspects of coalition warfare. From the entry of the United States into World War II, he distinguished himself by his ability to cooperate with the British, both in strategic planning and in developing structures for joint commands. When in May 1942 Chief of Staff George C. Marshall sent Eisenhower to London as spokesman for an early cross-Channel invasion, the British supported him for command of the invasion of North Africa that was the eventual outcome of the negotiations.

In the Mediterranean campaigns, and later as commander-designate of Operation Overlord, Eisenhower succeeded in establishing both institutional and personal cooperation among armies, navies, and air forces with greatly different mentalities and long records of internal rivalries. He was able to keep Britain's most distinguished and difficult soldier, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, a functioning member of the Allied team until the end of the war; he was able to drive in harness a team of senior U.S. officers whose opinions of their own talents were often higher than combat would sustain.

Eisenhower's success as a coalition commander, matched by few and surpassed by none, merits on its face inclusion in the ranks of great captains. His critics nonetheless argue that as a general, Eisenhower's record was mediocre. He learned his craft on the job—often with no help from subordinates—and his performance steadily improved. From start to finish, however, he remained cautious, preferring to hedge his bets whenever possible. During the D day campaign he pursued a broad-front strategy, taking advantage of local opportunities such as the Normandy breakout, but never sought to push success. Arguments that his caution dissipated chances to end the war in 1944, or capture Berlin and Vienna before the Russians, or a half-dozen other alleged failures of omission, have the advantage of hindsight. Eisenhower had both a clear understanding of his own capabilities and a solid sense of what the forces under his command could do—and what they could do well. He had the wisdom to "play within himself," and to recognize that modern war seldom rewards the spectacular. In May 1945 Eisenhower stood as master of the field in the Western Alliance.
Viewpoint:
Yes, Eisenhower was an effective military leader who brilliantly led the Allied Expeditionary Force to crush the Wehrmacht in western Europe.

General of the Army Dwight D. „Ike” Eisenhower emerged from World War II in resplendent glory. As Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, Eisenhower directed the vast array of Western armies that landed on D-Day (6 June 1944) and in the ensuing campaigns crushed the Wehrmacht (German Army) in the west. By Eisenhower’s own account on the day of the surrender, there were more than three million Americans serving under his direct command. Combined forces led by Eisenhower on V-E Day (8 May 1945) exceeded four million combatants. He was by any standard one of the most successful coalition commanders in history.

Successful leadership in modern warfare is based on two fundamental principles: knowing what to do and knowing how to do it. A commander can learn the first tenet by schooling and experience. Comprehending the second principle is what marks a successful commander. The twenty-six years of Eisenhower’s career prior to World War II witnessed the development of a highly adept professional officer. By taking advantage of the opportunities for formal military education, by learning the complexities and efficient operations of multi-echelon staffs and by studying under the tutelage of the army’s most forward-looking officers, Eisenhower developed the techniques that prepared him for the awesome task confronting him. From 8 November 1942 until the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany, Eisenhower commanded the most effective military coalition in history. He had no precedents on which to base his decisions. He faced innumerable obstacles, including the organization of a truly joint and combined allied staff.

During the war, Eisenhower’s subordinate commanders were often critical of his method of command. Omar Bradley considered him a political general of rare and valuable gifts, but unable to manage a battlefield. George S. Patton repeatedly criticized his boss for “timidity and the inability or unwillingness to command [Field Marshal Bernard] Montgomery.” Sir Arthur Bryant, in Turn of the Tide, 1939–1943: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrookes, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (1957), noted that British commanders were equally critical, attempting to push Eisenhower “into the stratosphere and rarefied atmosphere of a supreme commander” in order for Montgomery actually to manage the battlefield. In spite of this dissension, Eisenhower succeeded because he demonstrated that he not only knew what had to be done, but how to accomplish it.

The path to the top was not always easy. Like most successful commanders, Eisenhower matured in the job. Available primary sources clearly indicate that as theater commander in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and Europe, Eisenhower concentrated his personal attention on two basic concerns. One was the creation of an allied command structure and organization, and the other was the planning and execution of broad strategies to defeat the Axis forces in Europe. Additionally, the central theme of his wartime correspondence to George C. Marshall revolved around his education as a combat commander. Eisenhower was much less sure of himself in 1942 than in 1944, when his letters brimmed with confidence in his ability to manage the battlefield. In the interim Eisenhower greatly improved his comprehension of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, as well as their accompanying political implications.

As the Allied commander of the invasion of Northwest Africa (Operation Torch), Eisenhower fumbled badly in the political arena when he consummated the infamous “Darlan deal” without prior consultation with the Army chief of staff. Despite initial operational success, his forces were locked in stalemate in Tunisia in mid-February 1943 when Erwin Rommel counterattacked and delivered a crushing defeat at Kasserine Pass. Despite personal misgivings, Eisenhower promptly relieved the American commander of II Corps and took a more active role in directing operations, but the overall performance of the American army in North Africa and Eisenhower in particular, was less than satisfactory and did nothing to mollify the British perception that the Americans were amateur soldiers and could not hold their weight against the more experienced German army. The campaign did achieve two noteworthy effects—it hardened Eisenhower as a commander and gave the green American troops battle experience that they exploited in the next operation.

In Sicily the American Seventh Army, now commanded by Patton, achieved far more spectacular success, but Eisenhower continued to direct operations from an African command post, seemingly comfortable in commanding coalition forces through British air, land, and sea subordinate commanders. If a word characterized his operational style in the Mediterranean, it was “cautious.” He remained strangely distant from the planning process and in the execution phase failed to intervene directly when the situa-
tion warranted. Consequently, the coordination between Montgomery’s and Patton’s forces throughout the campaign was haphazard at best. As a result, the majority of the German army escaped across the straits of Messina to live and fight on the Italian mainland. Though the American army came of age during the Sicilian campaign, the same could not be said of Eisenhower.

During Operation Overlord, the invasion of northwest Europe, Eisenhower emerged as a superb coalition commander. Prior to D day he made several crucial decisions that ensured the success of the amphibious invasion. Upon his initial review of the Overlord plan, following his designation as supreme commander, Eisenhower directed that the beachhead be expanded and more forces allocated for the initial invasion. Next, his insistence that strategic-air assets be diverted from attacking oil and petroleum centers in Germany to the destruction of France’s transportation network successfully isolated the lodgment area and prevented timely reinforcements from engaging the invasion force. Third, Eisenhower’s judicious employment of the British sixth and American eighty-second and 101st Airborne Divisions, against the strong advice of Air Chief Trafford Leigh-Mallory, sealed the lodgment area and allowed the Allies to establish and then expand the bridgehead. Finally, he made the decision that he, and he alone, could make—the decision to launch the invasion. In the process, according to historian Stephen E. Ambrose, he fixed his place in history.

During the ensuing campaign in Normandy, Eisenhower refused to become decisively engaged in the ground battle, again preferring to direct operations through Montgomery, his ground-forces commander. Unwilling to issue
decisive orders to Montgomery, Eisenhower flitted away valuable time as allied casualties mounted in the fighting through the Norman bocage (French farmland crisscrossed with hedges). Only by late July when German forces were stretched thin did the forces under Eisenhower achieve the necessary breakout. The failure to close the Falaise-Argentan pocket and quite possibly end the war during the summer of 1944 was the result of Eisenhower's indecisive command style, but on 1 September 1944 Eisenhower assumed command of all operations. That decision created a predictable rift within the Allied command structure, most notably with Montgomery and the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke. Nevertheless, Eisenhower remained fixed that with the German army in full retreat, the time had arrived that he should not only command, but also control the pace of the Allied advance across France and Belgium.

His decision to advance on Germany along a broad front, against Montgomery's preferred single thrust, remains debatable, but the broad advance ensured that the Germans were unable to establish a coherent defense prior to the time that Allied patrols approached the German border. Logistical constraints, not enemy action, finally halted the Allied drive west of the Rhine. If Eisenhower was to be faulted for Allied operations in the autumn of 1944, it lay in his failure to comprehend the necessity of opening the port of Antwerp in a timely manner, which represented the only real chance of ending the war in 1944. Though Antwerp fell under the jurisdiction of Montgomery, the ultimate responsibility lay with Eisenhower as supreme commander, and he missed a golden opportunity because he issued indecisive orders and vacillated between his principal subordinate commanders over logistical priorities.

When the Germans finally launched their counterattack in the Ardennes on 16 December 1944, Eisenhower first recognized the offensive was greater than a local thrust and initially realized the enemy attack now presented the Allies with an unparalleled opportunity to destroy the bulk of the Wehrmacht west of the Rhine. Immediately allocating American forces north of the Bulge to Montgomery's command, Eisenhower ignored national parochial prejudices that American forces serve only under American commanders, and he supervised the eventual destruction of the enemy within the ever-shrinking pocket. The Battle of the Bulge produced the heaviest American casualties of the European war, but in the process, the Allies destroyed Adolf Hitler's remaining operational reserves in the West.

Simultaneously, personal relations with Montgomery continued to deteriorate. When Montgomery again questioned Eisenhower's ability to direct the land battle, the supreme commander had enough. Writing to Montgomery, Eisenhower regretted the development of such an "unbridgeable gulf of conviction between us that we would have to present our differences to the Combined Chiefs of Staff." Whereas Eisenhower appeared initially reluctant to relieve Major General Lloyd Fredendall in the wake of the Kasserine debacle, he was on the verge of relieving Great Britain's senior field commander if Allied solidarity was now in jeopardy. Faced with his own dismissal, Montgomery backed down and assured Eisenhower that henceforth the supreme commander could rely on him and "all under Montgomery's command would go all out 100%" to implement Eisenhower's strategy. If Eisenhower exerted his authority more ruthlessly by 1945 than he had in 1942, it was because the exigencies of war dictated more drastic measures.

By March the Western Allies crossed the Rhine and within two months destroyed the bulk of Germany's remaining forces. Though Eisenhower's decision not to drive on Berlin was harshly criticized by Winston Churchill and Montgomery at the time, the decision was not controversial to Eisenhower, who remained fully cognizant of the postwar boundaries as determined at Yalta (4–11 February 1945). At the same time he fully understood that American forces in the European theater would likely be transferred to the Pacific to bring the Japanese war to a successful conclusion. Unless otherwise directed by President Harry S Truman or Marshall, Eisenhower was not content to allow American soldiers to die for what he termed strictly political reasons. Moreover, the possibility that Hitler might be preparing the Alpine Redoubt dictated the dispersion of Allied forces toward Bavaria. By May the war in Europe was over. In the final analysis, the true measure of a field commander's success is ultimate victory on the battlefield. Eisenhower was no exception. Command experience in war reflected his prewar service under Generals Fox Conner, John J. Pershing, Douglas MacArthur and Marshall. Enjoying Marshall's full support, Eisenhower succeeded in defeating the Axis forces in Europe by clearly defining a command organization based on unity of command and by carefully selecting skilled com-
manders and staff personnel capable of executing his broad plans and objectives.

How does Eisenhower rate in the pantheon of military heroes? Eisenhower made far more correct decisions than he made poor ones. Though he never possessed a commander’s intuition of the battlefield, he matured in command from the cautious days in Tunisia to the final capitulation of Germany at Reims. His greatest strength lay in his complete dedication to Allied unity. He understood far better than Bradley, Patton, and even Montgomery, that the final victory was to be an Allied victory, not a national triumph. Best evidenced by his broad-front advance, Eisenhower intended that no single general or national army was going to win the war alone. He clearly understood how important the war was to the British. How else could one explain his approval to allow Montgomery to launch the ill-fated Market-Garden in September 1944, an obvious effort to restore British morale after the fast-paced American advance in the aftermath of Bradley’s Operation Cobra the preceding July. In March 1945 he intentionally withheld permission from Jacob Devers’s sixth Army Group to cross the Rhine when U.S. and French forces could easily have done so until Montgomery launched Operation Varsity, in order that Great Britain could take pride in Montgomery’s success. In short, Eisenhower was the most successful coalition commander and, within eleven months of launching the cross-Channel attack he was able to cable the Combined Chiefs of Staff: “The mission of this Allied force was fulfilled at 0241 local time, May 7, 1945.”

—COLE C. KINGSEED, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT

Viewpoint:
No, at best Eisenhower was an effective coordinator of Allied resources; he remained too removed from actual battle to be called a leader.

From the early years of World War II, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s fitness to lead Allied soldiers became a controversial issue, and it remains so. Nationalism, service pride, and individual egos have influenced the international debate on Eisenhower’s effectiveness as the strategic commander of Allied forces. When the war started in Europe in September 1939, Eisenhower was a lieutenant colonel with considerable staff and administrative experience, but little experience in leading soldiers and commanding tactical units. By 1944, as Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, Eisenhower commanded and directed all Allied air, sea, and land forces in the Normandy invasion. He then planned and directed the northwest Europe theater strategy until the end of the war in May 1945. Eisenhower’s rise from lieutenant colonel to general was nothing less than amazing. He achieved senior rank without commanding major tactical or operational units, and without service in combat. The question is: was Eisenhower an effective strategic commander, despite his lack of command experience at tactical and operational levels?

When Eisenhower was given command of the landings in North Africa in 1942, he had neither the experience nor the knowledge in operational and tactical doctrine to command such an operation. During the campaign Eisenhower’s lack of experience was consistently obvious. As recorded by Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury in Masters of the Art of Command (1975), the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, wrote that Eisenhower had neither the tactical nor strategic experience required for such a task. By writing to his German commander, Eisenhower had been flattered and pleasing the Americans in so far as we were placing our senior and experienced commander to function under their commander who had no war experience.

The British, with the approval of U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, responded by putting in place a command structure that in essence elevated Eisenhower to the status of supreme commander and effectively removed him from the battlefield and the conduct of operations while retaining for Americans the top position. The British assumed the positions of deputy for ground, sea, and air, and essentially took over the conduct of operations in the Mediterranean theater. These operations were primarily a function of British strategic thinking. As recorded in Norman Gelb’s Ike and Monty (1994), Alanbrooke concluded: “The main impression I gathered was that Eisenhower was no real director of thought, plans, energy or direction. Just a coordinator, a good mixer, a champion of inter-Allied co-operation, and in those respects few can hold the candle to him. But is that enough?”

The Combined Chiefs named Ike commander in chief for the Sicily operation. But Ike had no direct command responsibility for planning and executing the operation. The Combined Chiefs delegated this responsibility to Ike's deputies for ground, air and sea. . . . Ike had become in his own description, "chairman of the board," presiding over a committee of three to run the war.

The situation remained unchanged in the campaign for the invasion of Europe. The British again managed to retain all the top-level operational command positions: Montgomery as ground commander, Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay as commander-in-chief of naval forces, and Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory as commander-in-chief of air forces. As a result, Eisenhower never had the opportunity to mature as a tactical and operational commander in war. He never personally led a combat unit of any size in battle. He was not a traditional American military commander in the vein of George Washington, Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, John J. Pershing, or Douglas MacArthur. His lack of combat experience precluded him from obtaining the respect automatically given to those who have served in battle. The words of Montgomery—"nice chap, no general"—, Alanbrooke, and other British generals were blunt and often unkind in their appraisal of Eisenhower's abilities as a general. Certain American generals and admirals were also critical of Eisenhower's leadership. George S. Patton was probably the most critical of Eisenhower, and in his diary accused him of one of the worst sins an American commander could be charged with: failing to look after the welfare of his soldiers:

The U.S. Troops get wholly separated and all chance of being in at the kill [the conclusion of the North African campaign] and getting some natural credit is lost. Bradley and I explained this to Ike and he said he would stop it. He has done nothing. He is completely sold out to the British. . . . Ike must go. He is a typical case of a beggar on horseback—could not stand prosperity.

Patton believed that Eisenhower was "too weak in character to be worthy" of his loyal subordinate commanders. In his diary in January 1945, Patton wrote: "It is too bad that the highest levels of command. . . . have no personal knowledge of war. . . ." Bradley, too, held a low assessment of Eisenhower's knowledge and understanding of the art of war, writing in his memoir that "Ike sent me my first official letter as II Corps commander. It was very long, patronizing in tone, and it contained some specific tactical suggestions which were dangerously ill-conceived and proof to me (if further proof were needed) that Ike had little grasp of sound battlefield tactics."

During the war Eisenhower increasingly developed a British outlook. This is not surprising given the fact that all his operational commanders throughout the war were British. At the strategic level this meant that major campaigns tended to be a function of British strategic thinking. In 1942 and 1943 the British were the senior partners in the British American alliance, and dominated Allied planning. The campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy were primarily a function of British strategic and operational thinking. Under these conditions the American practice of war through Eisenhower was subordinate to the British strategy. In 1944 and 1945, as American resources dominated the British American war effort, Eisenhower took a more active role in operations. The result was a sequence of serious mistakes.

After the war Admiral John Leslie Hall, commander of Task Force "O," which landed the First Infantry Division at Omaha Beach, wrote, as recorded by Susan H. Godson in Viking of Assault: Admiral John Leslie Hall, Jr., and Amphibious Warfare (1982), Eisenhower "was one of the most overrated men in military history." Eisenhower's knowledge of tactical and operational doctrine was undeveloped. In particular, he did not grasp the complexities of amphibious operations. This lack of understanding precluded him from accurately assessing the merits of Montgomery's invasion plan. The following statement made by Eisenhower and recorded in Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl's The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific (1951) reflects Eisenhower's inability to appreciate the complexity of amphibious landings:

"You know an amphibious landing is not a particularly difficult thing," he said, "but it's a touchy and delicate thing, and anything can go wrong. In some ways, from the land fellow's viewpoint, it is one of the simplest operations. You put your men in boats and as long as you get well-trained crews to take the boats in, it is the simplest deployment in the world—the men can go nowhere else except to the beach."

This statement is clearly the view of the uninitiated. It is indicative of two things: Eisenhower was not tactically and operationally sophisticated in amphibious operations, nor did he talk to or listen to his American operational and tactical commanders. Admirals Hall and Henry K. Hewitt, as well as Generals Patton, Leonard T. Gerow, and Clarence R. Huebner, were more or less left with the impression that the supreme commander did not care to hear what they had to say. They were unable to present their views and too
On 8 May 1945 General Dwight D. Eisenhower issued the following message to his troops:

The crusade on which we embarked in the early summer of 1944 has reached its glorious conclusion. It is my especial privilege, in the name of all nations represented in this theatre of war, to commend each of you for the valiant performance of duty.

Though these words are feeble, they come from the bottom of a heart overflowing with pride in your loyal service and admiration for you as warriors. Your accomplishments at sea, in the air, on the ground and in the field of supply have astonished the world.

Even before the final week of the conflict you had put 5,000,000 of the enemy permanently out of the war. You have taken in stride military tasks so difficult as to be classed by many doubters as impossible. You have confused, defeated and destroyed your savagely fighting foe. On the road to victory you have endured every discomfort and privation and have surmounted every obstacle that ingenuity and desperation could throw in your path. You did not pause until our front was firmly joined up with the great Red Army coming from the east and other Allied forces coming from the south.

Full victory in Europe has been attained. Working and fighting together in single and indestructible partnership you have achieved a perfection in the unification of air, ground and naval power that will stand as a model in our time.

The route you have traveled through hundreds of miles is marked by the graves of former comrades. From them have been exacted the ultimate sacrifice. The blood of many nations—American, British, Canadian, French, Polish and others—has helped to gain the victory. Each of the fallen died as a member of a team to which you belong, bound together by a common love of liberty and a refusal to submit to enslavement. No monument of stone, no memorial of whatever magnitude could so well express our respect and veneration for their sacrifice as would the perpetuation of the spirit of comradeship in which they died.

As we celebrate victory in Europe let us remind ourselves that our common problems of the immediate and distant future can be best solved in the same conceptions of cooperation and devotion to the cause of human freedom as have made this Expeditionary Force such a mighty engine of righteous destruction. Let us have no part in the profitless quarrels in which other men will inevitably engage as to what country and what service won the European war.

Every man and every woman of every nation here represented has served according to his or her ability and efforts and each has contributed to the outcome. This we shall remember and in doing so we shall be revering each honored grave and be sending comfort to the loved ones of comrades who could not live to see this day.


Hewitt was two levels of command below Eisenhower and rarely saw the supreme commander. Eisenhower made little effort to see his subordinate naval commanders or seek their advice. He permitted himself to be separated from the nuts and bolts of operational and tactical planning. As a consequence, when he took charge of planning the Normandy invasion he was a novice in the conduct of amphibious warfare. He had to rely heavily on the experience and knowledge of Montgomery and other senior British operational commanders.

With the exception of certain officers temporarily detailed to planning committees, there were no naval officers, either British or American on the Supreme Commander's Staff. Admiral Cunningham felt that the General [Eisenhower] should look to him for naval advice, and that there should be no naval officer on the staff to exert a direct influence on the Supreme Commander's decisions.
A further example of Eisenhower's incapacity to make decisions regarding the combat employment of American soldiers was his directive to maximize the loading of landing craft in order to secure sufficient craft to conduct Operation Anvil, the proposed amphibious assault on southern France that was originally to be conducted in conjunction with the Normandy invasion. Because of a shortage in landing craft the plan was reviewed. The British believed Anvil could and should be canceled, not only for this reason but also because the landing site was too far away to act as diversion to draw German forces away from Normandy. Eisenhower, in an effort to maintain the operation, had his staff develop a loading plan for landing craft that maximized the capacity of the vessels, but destroyed tactical organizations and flexibility. Montgomery initially opposed the new loading plan on the grounds that it would “compromise tactical flexibility, introduce added complications, bring additional hazards into the operations, and thus generally endanger success.” Eventually Montgomery, however, perhaps for the sake of Allied cooperation, backed away from his initial response and accepted the proposal. Perhaps in this case Montgomery was the better judge. The new organization disrupted unit integrity, and thereby diminished combat power. In the army there is an old common-sense saying, “Train the way you fight.” Huebner and the staff of the First Infantry Division believed that this common-sense principle was violated at considerable cost in the invasion at Normandy.

Eisenhower did not exert the type of influence traditionally expected of American military leaders because he did not have the authority to select his subordinate commanders. Those decisions, rightly or wrongly, were made by political leaders—Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. His primary objective also was to maintain the coalition. Furthermore, he adopted in part the British doctrine of war. Finally, he lacked the tactical and operational experience to assess and make decisions on the basic principles and doctrinal considerations upon which the plan was based. It may also have been that his inexperience caused a lack of confidence, producing a tendency to defer to the supposed superior knowledge of others. Eisenhower procured, allocated, and managed resources; coordinated the use of assets; generated consensus; and informed superiors and political leaders. He placated, cajoled, appeased, compromised, and occasionally dictated. There were those rare occasions when Eisenhower stood his ground and was immovable. Two such occasions arose in the Normandy campaign: one over command of the strategic air forces of both nations, and another over Operation Dragoon, the invasion of southern France. British and American air commanders believed the quickest way to end the war was through the strategic-bombing campaign. They opposed the commanded structure and bombing plans proposed by the Supreme Commander. Eisenhower, however, was successful in gaining some level of control over Allied air power. Eisenhower also fought to maintain the amphibious landings in the south of France. The landing was postponed, but ultimately took place bringing ashore another Allied army and French forces. In both cases Eisenhower knew he had the support of Marshall. Eisenhower did not lead or command in the traditional sense, nor did he formulate a strategic vision for winning the war. Eisenhower was an effective coordinator—not an effective military commander.

—ADRIAN LEWIS, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

References


Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970);


Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 2 volumes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972–1974);

Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of Command (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975);


Sir Arthur Bryant, Turn of the Tide, 1939–1943: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshals Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (New York: Doubleday, 1957);
Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942 to 1945 (Garden City, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1946);

Alfred D. Chandler Jr., and others, eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, volumes 1-5 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970);

Ed Cray, General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman (New York: Norton, 1990);

David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 1943–1945 (New York: Random House, 1986);

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948);


Norman Gelb, Ike and Monty: Generals at War (New York: Morrow, 1994);

Susan H. Godson, Viking of Assault: Admiral John Lesslie Hall, Jr., and Amphibious Warfare (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982);


Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him (New York: Putnam, 1987);

Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954);